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Handling bioterror events that involve contagious agents is a major 
concern in the war against terror, and is a cause for debate among 
policymakers about the best response policy. At the core of this debate 
stands the question which of the two post-event policies to adopt: mass 
vaccination—where maximum vaccination capacity is utilized to 
uniformly inoculate the entire population, or trace (also called ring or 
targeted) vaccination—where mass vaccination capabilities are traded off 
with tracing capabilities to selectively inoculate only contacts  
(or suspected contacts) of infective individuals. We present a dynamic 
epidemic-intervention model that expands previous models by capturing 
some additional key features of the situation and by generalizing some 
assumptions regarding the probability distributions of inter-temporal 
parameters. The model comprises a set of difference equations. The model 
is implemented to analyze alternative response policies. It is shown that a 
mixture of mass and trace vaccination policies—the prioritized 
vaccination policy—is more effective than either of the two 
aforementioned policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Responding to a bioterror event that involves contagious agents has become a major 
issue in the war against terror. There are many operational and logistic decisions that 
must be made carefully in order to effectively cope with such a threat. These decisions 
are roughly divided into two levels: Structural (strategic) decisions that need to be made 
in advance, and operational (real-time) decisions that must be made during the event. 
Some of the structural (strategic) problems are: 
 
• How many vaccines to produce and stock? 
• Which supply management policies to apply for allocating, deploying, and 
controlling inventories of vaccines and other related supplies? 
• What infrastructure (vaccination stations, quarantining facilities, etc.) is required? 
• What vaccination procedure (e.g., inoculation only, pre-vaccination screening for 
contra indication) to adopt? 
• How to determine the manpower requirements and personnel assignment? 
The operational (real-time) decisions include: 
• Identifying the type of the bioterror event. 
• Managing the contact tracing process (if applied). 
• Prioritizing efforts with respect to monitoring, isolating, quarantining, tracing, and 
vaccinating. 
• Coordinating the supply chain of vaccines and other supplies. 
• Identifying bottlenecks and potential congestion. 
• Determining capacities and setting service rates. 
 
One of the most critical decisions—a decision that has both structural and operational 
implications—is which vaccination policy to adopt. This question has generated debate 
among policymakers [1] and has also drawn much attention by the general public [2], [3]. 
The vaccination policy decision has two levels. At the first level, policymakers must 
choose between essentially two options: a preemptive approach in which the entire 
population is pre-vaccinated, and a “wait and see” approach where post-attack emergency 
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response (vaccination, quarantine, isolation) commences following an outbreak of the 
disease. Mixtures of these two options are possible too, i.e., pre-vaccination of first 
responders (e.g., health-care and law-enforcement personnel) only. Sociological and 
psychological considerations (is there a real threat or just a perceived one?) coupled with 
medical considerations (fear of side effects) have hindered policy makers from taking any 
significant preemptive action so far. 
 
If no significant preemptive measures are taken, the question at the second level is 
which post-event vaccination policy to adopt. The two policies that have been examined 
so far are mass vaccination and trace vaccination. In mass vaccination, maximum 
vaccination capacity is utilized to uniformly inoculate the entire population. In trace (also 
called ring or targeted) vaccination, only limited vaccination capacity is utilized to 
selectively inoculate contacts (or suspected contacts) of infective individuals. 
 
Several researchers have attempted to address the issue of the post-event vaccination 
process in the case of smallpox, and in particular to compare mass vaccination to trace 
vaccination. Kaplan, Craft, and Wein [4] propose a continuous-time deterministic model 
that comprises 17 ordinary differential equations. Their model, details of which are 
reported in [5], captures many important aspects of the situation, including the “race to 
trace.” The race to trace reflects the time constraints on the effectiveness of the 
vaccination process due to the limited time period in which an infective is  
vaccine-sensitive or “immunable.” They assume exponential distributions with regard to 
all of the time parameters (e.g., incubation time, infectious time) and therefore the 
transitions in their model are not dependent on the “age” of an individual in a certain 
stage of the epidemic. They also ignore the effect of the epidemic initial conditions. Some 
epidemic and operational parameters may have different values at the early stages of the 
epidemic than later on. For example, the vaccination process may need some setup time 
during which only a portion of the potential vaccination capacity can be utilized. Also, 
during the first generation of the disease (prior to detection) the infection rate may be 
higher and the isolation rate may be lower because of lack of situational awareness. 
Kaplan et al. [4] conclude that under reasonable conditions regarding the initial attack 
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size and the epidemic’s spread parameters, mass vaccination is generally more effective 
than trace vaccination. 
 
Contrary to the analytic macroscopic approach in [4], [5], Halloran, Longini, Azhar, 
and Yang [6] use a detailed simulation to model at the micro level a smallpox 
transmission process in a (socially) structured community of 2,000 people. The disease 
transmission process in their model takes into account the social structure of the 
community, attempting to better represent the way the epidemic spreads in the 
population. They assume that the random variables that are associated with the duration 
of the various stages of the epidemic are uniformly distributed—an assumption that can 
hardly be justified. They assert that according to their simulation, trace vaccination would 
prevent more smallpox cases per dose of vaccine than would mass vaccination. Due to 
the imbedded nonlinearities in the epidemic process, it is not clear if their conclusions 
derived for a population of 2,000 may also apply to a population of say 10 million. Their 
model also lacks the operational and logistical aspects that are accounted to in [4]. 
However, the Halloran et al. and the Kaplan et al. models are not inconsistent. The model 
in [4] gives similar results as the model in [6] when supplied the inputs used in [6]  
(see [7]). 
 
A Markov chain model of the epidemic progression is utilized by Meltzer, Damon, 
LeDuc, and Millar [8] to analyze various response options. Their conclusion is that only a 
combination of vaccination with an effective quarantine may eradicate the epidemic. The 
paper contains some epidemic progression data—some of which is used in our paper. 
Koopman [9] reviews the studies the models in [4] and [6] and suggests a possible third 
modeling approach based on a network model that describes the links among individuals. 
Such models are reported in [10] and [11]. Other researchers ([12], [13]) use  
distance-based models to analyze ring vaccination, which is a geographically oriented 
version of trace vaccination. Spatial effects are also examined in [14], where a high-
resolution computational model is developed. In a more recent publication [15], the 
authors develop a stochastic model of outcomes under various control policies. Their 
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model is limited in the sense that they assume, rather than derive, the post intervention 
basic reproductive rate. 
 
There are two main objectives in the current research. The first objective is to develop 
a flexible, large-scale analytic model that expands and generalizes previous models. Our 
model is conceptually similar to the model in [4], but it differs in the use of discrete 
rather than continuous time. Thus, it is in the form of a set of difference equations rather 
than differential equations. As it will be shown later on, a discrete model can more easily 
capture certain key operational, logistical, and epidemiological aspects of the situation. 
Also, in contrast to the constant hazard functions (exponential distributions) of the time 
parameters in [4] and the uniform distributions of these parameters in [6], our model 
makes no assumptions with regard to these distributions. It can take any finite-support 
distributions—including empirical. The model also explicitly represents the  
age-dependent transitions among the various stages of the epidemic. We also distinguish 
between the initial conditions of the epidemic and its operational and logistical  
steady-state parameters. 
 
The second objective is to propose an alternative vaccination policy, the prioritized 
vaccination policy (PVP), which may be viewed as a mixture of the mass vaccination 
policy (MVP) and the trace vaccination policy (TVP). We demonstrate that under a set of 
realistic assumptions regarding the epidemic parameters and the operational and logistical 
capabilities to handle it, the PVP is significantly more effective than either the MVP or 
the TVP individually. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the possible response 
options for a bioattack, and in Section 3 we present the model. The three vaccination 
policies—PVP, MVP, and TVP—are analyzed in Section 4. First, we examine the base 
case, which is similar to the scenario described in [4], and then we perform sensitivity 
analysis. Section 5 contains the summary and conclusions. 
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2. The Epidemic and the Possible Interventions 
 
We consider a situation where a malevolent agent engages a population with an act of 
terror by releasing the smallpox virus in a public area. This act of terror is clandestine, 
and the authorities are not aware of the event until a certain number of symptomatic 
patients are reported and diagnosed as carrying the disease. Once the epidemic is detected 
and identified, a response is initiated, which involves isolation, quarantine, tracing 
contacts and vaccinating some or all of the population. The disease has an incubation 
period before an infected individual becomes symptomatic. During the incubation period 
the infected individuals are not infectious, and therefore the disease is not transmitted to 
others. The incubation period is divided into two periods of time: the immunable (also 
called vaccine sensitive) period and the non-immunable period. During the immunable 
period, vaccination is effective. It will eradicate the disease from an infective at that stage 
with high probability. During the non-immunable period, vaccination is not effective, and 
therefore the infective will eventually become ill. Once the incubation period is over, the 
infected individual becomes infectious. The infectious period lasts as long as the 
symptoms still persist. As in [4], the transmission of the disease is in the form of 
homogeneous mixing. 
 
At any given time t, the population of non-vaccinated individuals is divided into the 
following six possible stages: 
 
S: Susceptible to the disease;  
A: Infected, not yet infectious (incubating), and immunable (vaccine sensitive); 
B: Infected, not yet infectious (incubating), and not immunable; 
I: Infected, infectious, and not yet isolated; 
Q: Infected, infectious, and isolated, 
R: Removed, recovered, and immune or dead. 
 
The durations of the stages A, B, I, and Q are random variables with probability mass 
functions ( ), ( ), ( ), and ( ),A B I QP j P j P j P j  respectively. The parameter j indicates the 
 6  
number of days—the time resolution of the model—an individual stays at a certain stage. 
Note that while ( ), ( ), and ( )A B QP j P j P j are determined purely by epidemic 
characteristics, PI(j) is affected also by the response process and in particular, the 
effectiveness of the detection and quarantine efforts. Numerical values of the various 
probability mass functions that are selected for the base case in the analysis are taken 
from [8]. 
 
Once the epidemic is identified, detected infectious individuals (in stage I) are 
isolated (moved to stage Q) and the vaccination process commences. Two potential 
vaccination queues may be formed: the general queue and the tracing queue. The general 
queue comprises non-vaccinated individuals (in stages S, A, and B) who are not in the 
tracing queue. The tracing queue comprises all non-vaccinated contacts named by an 
index case. An index case is a newly detected infectious individual. Because of the 
additional effort that is required to trace contacts, the service rate at the tracing queue is 
lower than that at the general queue. The tracing service reduction factor is the ratio 
between the service rates at the general queue and tracing queue. We assume that a 
certain portion of the vaccination capacity is allocated to the tracing queue and the rest is 
applied to the general queue. 
 
The set of contacts that are named by a certain index case is called the index set. Let 
E denote the set of index cases and let Ji denote the index set of i E∈ . The index set Ji 
may comprise three possible disjoint subsets: 
 
Ji(1) – Infected individuals not yet vaccinated; 
Ji(2) – Non-infected (susceptible) individuals not yet named or vaccinated; 
Ji(3) – Individuals named and vaccinated earlier by another index or already vaccinated 
in the general queue. 
 
For a given index i the target population of the tracing process is Ji(1). Tracing 
individuals in Ji(2) is somewhat wasteful since there is no race to trace. The susceptible 
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individuals in Ji(2) can be vaccinated in the more efficient general queue. Tracing 
individuals in Ji(3) is clearly a waste of tracing capacity. Thus, 
 
(1) (2) (3)i i i iJ J J J= U U           (1) 
 






To properly represent the effective vaccination rate at the tracing queue we need to 
introduce three terms: (index case) i-infective, newly named i-infective, and potentially 
traceable. An i-infective is an individual that has been infected by index case i. For each 
infective the transmitter is uniquely defined. That is, an infective cannot be infected 
twice. Notice that an i-infective may be named by another non-transmitter index case j 
before being named by its transmitter i. An i-infective, not previously named by another 
index case, nor vaccinated, which is named by index case i is called newly-named  
i-infective. An i-infective, not yet traced or vaccinated, is said to be potentially traceable 
(PT) if its corresponding transmitter i has been detected and interviewed. Let Pi denote 
the set of PT i-infectives. Clearly, the sets Pi, i E∈  are disjoint. A newly named  
i-infective is PT, but a PT i-infective may not be newly named if the corresponding index 
case failed to name this contact. The state PT is transient, that is, an i-infective is PT only 
during the time period when i is interviewed. An i-infective that has not been named by 
its corresponding index i becomes non-PT once again in the next period. Thus, an  
i-infective may pass through three possible states: pre-PT, PT, and post-PT. By 
definition, an individual in the post-PT state will never become PT again. He may be 
traced however by a non-transmitter index case. Also, an i-infective in the pre-PT state 
may never become PT if named by a non-transmitter. As in [4], we assume that 
iJ M=    for all index case i. Also, since we assume homogeneous mixing, that is, all 
index cases are identical with respect to the transmission process, iP N=     for all index 
cases i E∈ . However, unlike M that stays constant throughout the epidemic  
(e.g., M = 50 in [4]), N = N(t) changes over time as the epidemic progresses. As in [4], we 
assume that M ≥ N(t) for all t, that is, the size of the index set always exceeds the number 
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of PT infectives. Finally, let ω0 denote the probability that a PT infective is (newly) 
named by the corresponding index. 
 
Note that the total number of PT infectives at time t is Q1(t)N(t), where Q1(t) is the 
number of index cases that are detected and interviewed at time t. Similarly, Q1(t)M is the 
total number of names generated at time t by the index cases. We assume that M 
represents the net number of newly named contacts. Therefore, the index sets are disjoint. 
 
Let ( )tω  denote the fraction of the index set that contains newly named infectives. 
 
0
( )( ) .N tt
M
ω ω=             (2) 
 
Since there are no reliable estimates for 0ω , we will first assign, in the base case, a 
reasonable value for this parameter, and then we will perform a full-scale sensitivity 
analysis in Section 4. 
 
The definitions in (2) are used as a backdrop for the more generalized definitions in 
Section 3. 
 
Note that MVP and TVP generate only one queue each—general queue in MVP and 
tracing queue in TVP. The vaccination process that is proposed in this paper—PVP, 
which is described in the next section—generates both queues. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the epidemic stages and the transitions among them. The subscripts 
indicate the age of a certain stage. The terms 0, ,j j jA A A
− + denote cohorts at epidemic age j 
in the pre-PT, PT, and post-PT stages, respectively. Notice that in the absence of a 
corresponding index case, an individual may move from stage A− to stage B without 
being potentially traceable at all (see e.g., edge 1 2A B
− → ). One of the main objectives is 
to trace, as fast as possible and as many as possible, individuals in stage 0A  (see the 
shaded oval shape in Figure 2.1). 













Figure 2.1: The Epidemic Stages 
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Other parameters are: 
 
( )tα  – Infection rate; 
T(t) – The length of the tracing queue; 
L(t) – Total number of newly named infectives in the tracing queue; 
( )Tr t  – Tracing rate; 
V(t) – Nominal vaccination/tracing capacity; 
q – Proportion of the vaccination capacity allocated to the tracing queue; 
( )Gr t  – Vaccination rate in the general queue; 
r+(t) – The residual trace vaccination rate that is applied to individuals who are not 
newly named PT infectives (Recall that a newly-named PT infective is an 
infected individual that is named, for the first time, by the corresponding 
transmitter); 
( )tω  – Estimated fraction of the tracing queue that contains newly named infectives;  
0ω  – The probability of naming a PT infective; 
w(t) – The rate at which non-PT infectives become PT; 
M – Size (cardinality) of the index set (average number of traced individuals per 
index case); 
c – Tracing service reduction factor; 
e – Vaccination efficacy (% of vaccinations that result in a “take”). To simplify the 
exposition we assume initially that e = 1. This assumption is relaxed in the 
analysis; and 
D – Epidemic detection threshold. 
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3.2 Definitions and Derivations of Transitions 
 
The infection rate is given by 
 




α =              (4) 
 
where R0 is the basic reproductive ratio, E(I) is the mean duration of the infectious stage, 
and S(0) is the size of the population at the beginning of the epidemic. 
 
The tracing rate is 
 
{ ( ), ( )}     if  ( ) 0
( )( ) .
0                          Otherwise
T
Min qV t cT t T t
cT tr t
 >= 
          (5) 
The tracing queue is given by the following recursive equation: 
 
1( ) ( 1)(1 ( 1)) ( ),TT t T t r t MQ t= − − − +             (6) 
 
where Q1(t) is the number of new index cases at time t. 
 
The number of newly named infectives in the tracing queue is given recursively by 
 
0 0
0( ) ( 1)(1 ( 1)) ( ( ) ( )),TL t L t r t A t B tω= − − − + +            (7) 
 
The sum 0 0( ) ( )A t B t+  is the total number of PT infectives at time t. 
 




( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1, .
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )( ( ) ( ))
T
G
V t cT t r t
r t Min
S t A t A t B t B t A t B tω− + − +
 −=  + + + + + − + 
        (8) 
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Note that the general queue may include individuals that are susceptible, non-PT 








ω =               (9) 
 
( )tω is the estimated fraction of the tracing capacity that is applied to newly named 
PT infectives. It can be seen that (9) is a natural generalization of (2) for the tracing 
queue. The remaining portion 1- ( )tω of the tracing capacity generates the residual trace 
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− + − +
−= + + + + + − +               (10) 
 
The vaccination rates are non-zero only after the epidemic is detected. Detection 
occurs only after D symptomatic individuals report to emergency rooms. D is the 
epidemic detection threshold, which indicates the alertness and responsiveness of the 
medical and public health system. 
 
















,       X=A, B, I, Q.                    (11) 
 
The rate at which pre-PT infectives become PT depends on the rate at which 
infectious individual become index cases. 
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l
jβ  is the probability that an infectious individual, who is currently at the j-th day of 
his/her infectious period (I), will be detected l days from now. Notice that if l = 1, then 
1 ( )j B jβ ϕ= . 
 
Based on our assumption of homogeneous free mixing, the probability ul(t) that an 























                       (13) 
 
Thus, the probability wj(t) that a pre-PT infective who is at the j-th day of the 
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3.3 The Difference Equations 
 
The following set of difference equations describes the epidemic progression in case 
of intervention: 
 
( 1) ( )[1 ( ) ( )][1 ( ) ( )]GS t S t t I t r t r tα ++ = − − −                       (15) 
1 1( 1) [ ( ) ( ) ( )][1 ( ) ( )](1 (t))GA t t S t I t r t r t uα− ++ = − − −                      (16) 
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0
1 1( 1) [ ( ) ( ) ( )][1 ( ) ( )] (t)GA t t S t I t r t r t uα ++ = − −                      (17) 
1( 1) ( )[1 ( ) ( )](1 ( ))(1 (t))j j G A jA t A t r t r t j wϕ− − ++ + = − − − −                     (18) 
0




( 1) ( ( )(1 ( ) ( ))
( )(1 ( ) (1 )( ( ) ( ))))(1 ( ))
j j G
j T G A
A t A t r t r t




+ = − +
+ − − − + −                               (20) 
1( 1) ( ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ))(1 ( ) ( ))(1 (t))j j B j A G jB t B t j A t j r t r t wϕ ϕ− − − ++ + = − + − − −                   (21) 
0




( 1) ( ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ))(1 ( ) ( ))
( ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ))(1 ( ) (1 )( ( ) ( )))
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j B j A T G
B t B t j A t j r t r t
B t j A t j r t r t r t
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ω ω
+ + + +
+
+
+ = − + − − +





( 1) (( ( ) ( ))(1 ( ) ( ))
( )(1 ( ) (1 )( ( ) ( )))) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))
j j j G
j T G A j B
B t A t A t r t r t




+ = + − − +




( 1) ( ) ( )j B
j
I t B t jϕ∞
=
+ =∑                         (25) 
1( 1) ( )(1 ( ))j j II t I t jϕ+ + = −                         (26) 
1
1
( 1) ( ) ( )j I
j
Q t I t jϕ∞
=
+ =∑                         (27) 
1( 1) ( )(1 ( ))j j QQ t Q t jϕ+ + = −                         (28) 
 
Explanation of the Equations 
 
First we observe that the vaccination rates are as follows: a fraction 0ω of the PT 
infectives—the newly named infectives—are vaccinated at a rate rt(t), while the rest of 
the population is vaccinated at a rate rG(t) + r+(t). Recall that the parameter ( )r t+  is the 
residual portion 1- ( )tω  of the trace vaccination capacity that is applied to (“wasted” on) 
individuals that are not newly named PT infectives. 
 
Equation (15): The remaining susceptibles are those who have not been vaccinated nor 
infected. 
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Equations (16), (17): The newly infected are among those who have not been vaccinated 
neither in the general queue nor by the residual tracing capacity. The parameter u1(t) is 
the probability that a newly infected becomes immediately PT. 
 
Equation (18): The immunable pre-PT infectives are those who have not been 
vaccinated (neither in the general queue nor by the residual tracing capacity), are still 
immunable (1 ( )A jϕ− ) and have not become PT (1-wj(t)). 
 
Equation (19): The immunable PT infectives at time t+1 comprise immunable pre-PT 
infectives ( ( )jA t
− ) who have not been vaccinated, are still immunable (1 ( )A jϕ− ), and 
have become PT (wj(t)). 
 
Equation (20): The immunable post-PT infectives at time t+1 comprise previously 
immunable PT ( 0 ( )jA t ) and post-PT ( ( )jA t
+ ) infectives that have not been vaccinated and 
remain immunable (1 ( )A jϕ− ). The vaccination rate of the PT individuals is a convex 
combination of the (net) tracing rate and the combined vaccination rate of the general 
queue and the residual tracing capacity. 
 
Equations (21)-(23): These equations are similar to (18)-(20). They represent the 
transition from an immunable stage to a non-immunable stage. 
 
Equations (24): This equation records the total number of the non-immunable infectives. 
We need the two representations of stage B cohort ((21)-(23) and (24)) because of the 
fact that vaccinating individuals at that stage is ineffective; they will eventually become 
sick. Thus, (21)-(23) are needed for determining the vaccination queue sizes for pre-PT, 
PT, and post-PT infectives, while (24) counts the individuals who will eventually become 
infectious (see Equation (25)). 
 
Equation (25): The newly infectious individuals comprise infectives whose incubation 
period has ended. 
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Equation (26): The remaining infectious individuals at stage I are those who have not 
been detected yet. 
 
Equation (27): The newly isolated infectious individuals (new index cases) are those 
who have been detected. 
 
Equation (28): The remaining individuals in isolation are those who have not been 
removed yet (recovery or death). 
 
The model that has been described above is general and can represent several 
vaccination policies. Specifically, once the vaccination process has been initiated, the 
MVP implies that 0( ) ( ) 0 for all , and ( ) 0T Gr t r t t r tω+= = = >  for all t, such that S(t) > 0. 
In TVP, ( ) 0 for all , and ( ), ( ) 0G Tr t t r t r t
+= > for all t, such that T(t) > 0. 
 
The PVP policy is a combination of mass vaccination and trace vaccination where at 
all times treating the tracing queue preempts the general queue. Whenever there are new 
index cases, an appropriate vaccination capacity is allocated for tracing and vaccinating 
the generated named contacts (Index Set). The tracing/vaccination capacity allocated to 
the tracing queue is limited only by the total existing vaccination capacity, that is, q = 1. 
Mass vaccination is carried on with the remaining vaccination capacity. The parameter c, 





The model developed in Section 3 is applied now to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
prioritized vaccination process (PVP) in comparison with the mass vaccination process 
(MVP) and the trace vaccination process (TVP). Recall that in PVP the first priority is for 
the tracing queue, and the remaining vaccination capacity is applied to the general queue. 
An individual is treated in the general queue only if he is not claimed by the tracing 
queue. 
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4.1 Base Case 
 
Whenever it is relevant, the parameters chosen for the base case are similar to those in 
[4]. We also assume for this case that the values of the parameters remain constant 
throughout the duration of the epidemic. In particular, there are no special initial 
conditions. The values of the various epidemic, population, and operational parameters 
are shown in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 presents the characteristics of the probability mass 
functions of the time parameters. These probability distributions are consistent with the 
assumptions in [4] and the data in [8]. 
 
 
Value Definition Symbol 
500,000* Daily vaccination capacity V(t) 
10-7 Infection rate α(t) 
1,000 Number of initially infected 
1 (0)A
−  
107 Size of population S(0) 
4 Tracing service reduction factor c 
50 Size of the index set M 
0.7 Probability of naming a PT infective ω0 
20 Epidemic detection threshold D 
0.975 Vaccination efficacy E 
* In [4] the vaccination capacity is assumed to be 106. We believe that 500,000 is a more realistic estimate, 
at least for Israel. 
 
Table 4.1: The Base Case Parameters 
Time Period P0.05 P0.95 Mean Median
Incubation (A) 1 5 3 3 
Incubation (B)* 8 14 11.5 11.5 
Infectious (I) 1 5 3 3 
Isolation (Q) 9 15 12 12 
* Time is measured from the day of infection. 
 
Table 4.2: The Base Case Probability Distributions. 
 
The probability distributions in Table 4.2 are also consistent with the limited data 
regarding the probable durations of the various stages that are reported mainly in [16] and 
[17]. 
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PVP 1,015 57 days 1,002 beds 
MVP 2,232 58 days 1,765 beds 
TVP > 108,000 > 1 year 9,380 beds 
* Excluding the initially infected (1,000). 
 
Table 4.3: Results for the Base Case. 
 
If we take the exact same parameters as in [4], that is, V(t) = 106 and ω0 = 0.5, then 
the numbers of infected are 560 and 818 for PVP and MVP, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the progression of the epidemic under each one of the three 


















Note: Including the initially infected that are depicted in the graph of days 6-16. 
 
Figure 4.1: The Epidemic Progression. 
 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the significant differences among the three vaccination 
policies: MVP results in a relatively large number of second-wave infected individuals, 
but the epidemic is eradicated much faster than when TVP is executed. In TVP, the 
epidemic has initially smaller peaks than in MVP, but it is expanding gradually over a 
longer period of time (in the base case, the epidemic reaches its peak on day 159). In 
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The PVP is clearly more effective than the two other vaccination policies in the base 
case. It results in over 50% less derived infections (second wave and later infections that 
result from the initial attack of 1,000 infected) compared to MVP, and over 99% less 
derived infections compared to TVP. In both PVP and MVP, the epidemic is eradicated 
(and the entire population is inoculated) after almost two months. In the TVP case, the 
epidemic lasts a little over one year. The peak isolation/quarantine capacity needed for 
the PVP is less than 60% the peak capacity needed for MVP. The extra capacity needed 
in the MVP case is required relatively early in the epidemic since the first waves of 
infection may not be captured by the untargeted homogeneous vaccination process. In 
TVP and PVP, the vaccination is targeted at high-risk susceptibles, and therefore more 
stage-A individuals may be located and vaccinated at the early stages of the epidemic. 
However, the lack of massive vaccination in TVP results in prolonging and expanding the 
epidemic and thus increasing the total number infected. The peak isolation capacity in the 
TVP case (9,380) is needed on days 165 and 166 of the epidemic. These results are 
consistent with the conclusions in Kaplan et al. that MVP is significantly more effective 
than TVP. 
Note that the relative high efficiency of PVP is due to the synergy that is created by 
combining mass and trace vaccination. Mass vaccination builds up herd immunity that 
effectively reduces the value of R0, thus amplifying the effect of the tracing part of the 
process (See Figure 3 in [4]). 
 
In the absence of effective disease detection systems that can indicate the occurrence 
of a bio-attack event, the infected individuals in the first wave of infection—those who 
were infected by the initial bio-attack—cannot be helped. That is why the three graphs in 
Figure 4.1 coincide during days 1-16. 
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4.2 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Is the evident dominance of PVP over MVP and TVP robust? Does it dominate for 
other sets of parameters? 
 
To address these questions we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to some key 
parameters. Since in most cases TVP turns out to be inferior to PVP and MVP by almost 
two orders of magnitude, the comparisons in the following will focus at MVP and PVP 
only. The number of infectives shown in the analysis excludes those who were initially 
infected by the bioattack ( 1 (0)A
− ). 
 
Tracing Service Reduction Factor – c 
 
In the base case, we assumed that the tracing process consumes four times the 
vaccination resources needed for mass vaccination, that is, c = 4. This value is adopted 
from [4]. Arguably, the larger the value of c, the lower the relative efficiency of the 
tracing process, and thus the less likely it is that PVP will outperform MVP. Figure 4.2 
presents the effect of increasing c in increments of 10 on the effectiveness of PVP. 
Obviously, the varying of c does not affect the MVP, since there is no tracing activity. 
For PVP, the number of infected increases from 990 (c = 1). The break-even value of the 
tracing service Reduction Factor for PVP compared to MVP is c = 65. In other words, the 
tracing service rate must be more than 65 times slower than the general vaccination rate 




















Figure 4.2: Number of Infected as a Function of the Tracing Service Reduction Factor. 
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Size of the Index Set – M 
 
Similarly to the tracing service reduction factor c, the average number of cases that 
are traced per index case M does not affect MVP. However, increasing M, without 
increasing the value of ω0 at the same time, will clearly have a negative effect on PVP 
(and TVP) because of the inefficiencies that result from the tracing service reduction 
factor. Figure 4.3 presents the effect of varying M between 50 (the base case) and 500 on 
the performance of PVP. Notice that the effect is relatively small in this range. Increasing 



















Figure 4.3: Number of Infected in PVP as a Function of the Size of the Index Set. 
 
Epidemic Detection Threshold – D 
 
One would expect that the effectiveness of the response process will depend on the 
situational awareness of the healthcare system. The faster the outbreak of the epidemic is 
detected, the earlier response actions can be taken, and therefore fewer infected cases 
would be expected. Figure 4.4 shows the effect of the epidemic detection threshold on 
PVP and MVP. The effect of varying the detection threshold in the PVP case is similar to 
the effect in the MVP case: Moving from D = 100 to a fully alert system (D = 1) results in 
33% less infectives in both cases. 
 



















Figure 4.4: Number of Infected as a Function of the Detection Threshold. 
 
Daily Nominal Vaccination Capacity – V 
 
The results are sensitive to the assumption regarding the effective daily vaccination 
capacity, which is assumed here to be fixed over time. Figure 4.5 presents the effect of 
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Figure 4.5: Number of Infected as a Function of the Vaccination Capacity. 
 
Clearly, the effectiveness of MVP is more sensitive to the value of V than PVP. The 
advantage of PVP over MVP is most notable for small values of V. When the vaccination 
capacity is only 100,000 a day (not shown in the graph), the number of infected in the 
MVP case is more than 14 times higher than that number in the PVP case. This advantage 
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declines as V increases since the relative impact of the tracing process gets smaller. If  
V = 1M, then PVP results in 45% fewer casualties compared to MVP. 
 
Tracing Effectiveness – ω0 
 
This parameter reflects the efficiency of the tracing process. It is the maximum 
possible probability to trace an infective. In the base case, we assumed that this efficiency 
cannot exceed 70%. Clearly, the lower the upper bound, the less advantageous are PVP 
and TVP compared to MVP. Figure 4.6 shows the effect of ω0 on the number of 
infectives. TVP is more effective than MVP if ω0 ≥ 0.99, that is, only in the case of 
extremely high tracing effectiveness. For ω0 ≥ 0.1, PVP is the most effective policy. Its 
advantage over MVP increases, as ω0 gets larger. If ω0 = 0.5, then PVP results in 39% 




















Figure 4.6: Number of Infected as a Function of ω0. 
 
Effect of Initial Conditions 
 
During the initial stages of the epidemic some of the parameters may have different 
values than later on in the epidemic. We consider here three such parameters: the daily 
vaccination capacity V, the infection rate α, and the distribution function of the duration 
of the infectious period PI(j). Due to set-up time, we assume that during the first day of 
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vaccination V(1) = 200,000 only, compared to V(t) = 500,000 t > 1. In the base case,  
α =10-7, which implies that R0 = 3. During the first wave of infection, when the epidemic 
has not been detected yet, one may expect a higher infection rate. Thus, we assume that 
during the first wave R0 = 4. The lack of situational awareness leads also to an extended 
stage I period during the first wave. Therefore, we assume that the mean time of stage I 
during the first wave is E(I) = 4 days, compared to three days during the rest of the 
epidemic period. Table 4.4 presents the effect of these initial conditions on the number of 
infected—in comparison to the base case. 
 
Scenario PVP MVP 
Base Case 1,015 2,232 
Initial Conditions 2,131 4,218 
Base Case & E(I) = 4 1,814 3,548 
Base Case & R0 = 4 1,052 2,415 
Base Case & V(1) = 200K 1,083 3,415 
 
Table 4.4: The Effect of Initial Conditions. 
 
The effect of the initial conditions is not negligible. They result in almost 90% more 
casualties in MVP and twice that number in PVP. It is also observed that the length of the 
infectious period (Stage I) distribution function has the largest single impact among the 
three factors that affect the initial conditions. It follows that early pre-symptomatic 
detection of the epidemic is crucial in any vaccination policy. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
We have developed a new difference-equation model that captures key 
epidemiological and operational features of a bioattack response process. The model 
represents several inter-temporal parameters and processes—in particular, the process in 
which infected individuals become potentially traceable. The model has been 
implemented to analyze three vaccination policies: the mass vaccination process (MVP), 
the trace vaccination process (TVP), and the newly suggested prioritized vaccination 
process (PVP), in which high-priority tracing is conducted in conjunction with a 
complement mass vaccination effort. 
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The first conclusion of the analysis is a confirmation of the general result in [4] and 
[5], that is, mass vaccination is far more effective than trace vaccination. The second 
conclusion is that the prioritized vaccination policy is superior to the mass vaccination 
policy for any set of realistic parameters. Moreover, since the PVP “wastes” vaccination 
resources on tracing, one may argue that the tradeoff between MVP and PVP may be 
sensitive to the assumption regarding the service tracing service reduction factor (c) that 
reflects the degradation in the vaccination rate due to tracing. It is shown that this is not 
the case; PVP is more effective than MVP even if this ratio is higher than 60. It is also 
noted that the advantage of PVP over MVP increases as the vaccination resources become 
more limited (see Figure 4.5). The effectiveness of the PVP is also relatively insensitive 
to the size of the index set M. Tracing as low as five individuals per index case may be 
sufficient for obtaining satisfactory results. Finally, it is noted that initial awareness to 
such an attack, which may reduce the length of the first generation infectious stage (I), 
can have a significant effect on the total number of infected individuals. From the 
logistical point of view, the maximum daily isolation capacity that is needed for MVP is 
considerably higher than the capacity needed for PVP. 
 
Recall that the model presented here assumes homogeneous mixing. This assumption 
may not be realistic in many possible scenarios. Future work in response-policy analysis 
must take into account spatial and social effects. The newly emerging concept of  
“small world” network [18] may be utilized to model these effects. 
 
Acknowledgement: I would like to thank Professors Ed Kaplan, Rick Rosenthal, and 
Al Washburn for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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